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CATEGORIES AND CULTURE: ON THE
"RECTIFICATION OF NAMES" IN
COMPARATIVE LAW
Janet E. Ainswortht
[T] he wise man is careful to ... regulate names so that they will
apply correctly to the realities they designate. In this way he ...
discriminates properly between things that are the same and those
that are different.
Hsin Tzul
Recently I had an experience in my Chinese Law class that
prompted me to question how comparative law is taught and, by extension, to think about how comparative legal scholars can transcend
our own culturally-specific legal concepts and categories to draw valid
conclusions about the legal order of any non-Western society. I had
asked my students to read an excerpt from Hugh Scogin's fine article
on contract law in early imperial China 2 and was pleased with the robust class discussion that followed. One enthusiastic student lingered
after class to continue the discussion. "I was surprised that the Chinese had contract law as long ago as the Han Dynasty," the student
remarked. "Tell me," he continued, "Had the ancient Chinese developed promissory estoppel by then, too?" A bit taken aback by the
seemingly inapposite question, I wondered if the student might be
joking. The student's demeanor, however, showed me that he was indeed entirely serious. He saw nothing odd about the question, bet Associate Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law, BA. Brandeis University, MA. Yale University, J.D. Harvard Law School. I am grateful to the organizers and
participants of the following two conferences for giving me the opportunity to deliver developing versions of this Article and receive useful feedback: the University of British Columbia conference, "Chinese Law: A Re-examination of the Field: Theoretical and
Methodological Approaches to the Study of Chinese Law" and the University of Utah conference, "New Approaches to Comparative and Foreign Law." My appreciative thanks go
as well to Hugh Scogin, Randy Kandel, Frances Foster, Pitman Potter, and Sid DeLong for
reviewing drafts of this Article; the finished product reflects their helpful comments and
suggestions. Orthographic note: I have generally used standard pinyin romanization for
Chinese words and names. When, however, a Chinese name in the title of a footnoted
source material is romanized according to another system, I have retained that spelling in
my subsequent textual references to that person to avoid confusion. For instance, I render
the name of the early Confucian political thinker as Hsfin Tzu rather than Xunzi because
the Burton Watson translation of his writings uses Wade-Giles romanization.
I HsON Tzu, BAsIc WRTNs 142 (Burton Watson trans., 1963).
2 Hugh T. Scogin, Jr., Between Heaven and Man: Contract and the State in Han Lynasty
China, 63 S. CAL. L. Rma. 1325 (1990).
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cause he apparently regarded the development of the concept of
promissory estoppel as a natural evolutionary outgrowth of the law of
contracts, such that any civilization possessed of a jurisprudence of
contract doctrine would eventually produce the functional equivalent
of Section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts.
Instead of answering the question directly, I asked the student
why he assumed that the imperial Chinese legal system at some point
would have developed a doctrine similar to promissory estoppel.
Upon reflection, the student recognized he had erroneously assumed
that any legal order with a law of obligations would inevitably face the
question of whether to give legal effect to promises that induce detrimental reliance. As we talked, however, he began to appreciate the
extent to which promissory estoppel in our own legal system was inextricably connected to problems created by the requirement in classical
Anglo-American law that enforceable contracts be predicated upon
consideration.3 What had seemed at first to him a natural and obvious question common to any system of jurisprudence now began to
look more like a parochial concern of one particular legal system that
had chosen to predicate its law of obligation upon the doctrine of
consideration. 4 Beyond learning something in particular about imperial Chinese contract law, the student remarked, he had learned something in general about the relationship of legal doctrine to its specific
historical and cultural context.
I walked away from the conversation, however, with a nagging
sense that the student's initial misconception was itself a symptom of a
problem in the way that I approached the teaching of imperial Chinese law. In using the familiar nomenclature of Western legal doctrine to discuss the imperial Chinese legal system, had I unwittingly
encouraged my students to make invalid assumptions about the characteristics and dynamics of the Chinese legal order? The more I considered the matter, the more it seemed to me that adopting Western
legal terminology to discuss Chinese law would inevitably lead to misinterpretation of Chinese legal discourse and misperception of Chinese legal practice.5 Ironically for someone trained in Chinese
studies, I had committed the fundamental mistake of falling to ensure
s

For a classic explication of the relationship between the doctrine of consideration

and promissory estoppel, see Stanley D. Henderson, Promissory Esktppel and TraditionalContract Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343 (1969).
4 Cf. Arthur T. von Mehren, Civil-Law Analogues to Consideration:An Exercise in Comparative Analysis, 72 HAiv. L. R-v. 1009 (1959) (contrasting aspects of French and German

civil law contract doctrine with the Anglo-American doctrine of consideration).
5
I should note that Hugh Scogin displays in his scholarship a full appreciation of the
problem of using Western legal terminology in describing Chinese legal institutions and
practices. See Hugh T. Scogin, Jr., Civil "Law" in TraditionalChina: History and Theory, in
CIVIL LAW IN Q NG AND REPUBLicAN CHINA (Kathryn Bernhardt & Philip C.C. Huang eds.,
1994).
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that the language that I used properly corresponded to the Chinese
reality to which I referred. What is needed in comparative legal study,
I suggest, is nothing less than a thorough "rectification of names."
Chinese philosophy has a long tradition of intense engagement
with issues of language,6 including a long-standing preoccupation
with the correspondence of language and reality, of the name with the
named.7 Confucian writings, including the Analects of Confucius8
and the works of Hsfin-tzu,9 emphasized the importance of appropriate use of language and insisted upon the rectification of names;10
that is, calling all things by their proper names. In urging that we give
special attention to the language that we employ to describe nonWestern legal systems, I am not, of course, advocating rectification of
names in the technical sense that the term was used in Confucian
political theory. I do use the term, however, as an evocative device to
remind us that a heightened sensitivity to nomenclature is a particularly apt methodological stance for scholars working to bridge the intellectual gap between Western and non-Western legal cultures.
The fact that a recent conference on Chinese imperial law chose
as its focus theoretical and methodological approaches to Chinese
legal studies" shows that I am not alone in foregrounding methodological concerns in my teaching and scholarship. The current meth6 See, e.g., FREDERICKW. MOTE,INTELLEcUAL FOUNDATIONS OF CHINA 49, 105 (1971);
BENJAMIN I. SCvARTZ, THE WORLD OF THOUGHT IN ANCIENT CHINA 91-94 (1985).
7 This is not to say that the Chinese believed that there was a natural or preordained
relationship between language and reality. From the earliest period of Confucian thought,
the Chinese saw language as the arbitrary product of human faculties:
Names have no intrinsic appropriateness. One agrees to use a certain
name and issues an order to that effect, and if the agreement is abided by
and becomes a matter of custom, then the name may be said to be appropriate, but if the people do not abide by the agreement, then the name
ceases to be appropriate. Names have no intrinsic reality.
HsON Tzu, supra note 1, at 144. Centuries later, Western philosophy reached the same
conclusion by a very different route in the turn-of-the-century semiotics of Ferdinand de
Saussure. See FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS passim (Charles
Bally & Albert Sechehaye eds. & Wade Baskin trans., 1960) (1916) (asserting that the relationship between signifiers and signifieds is arbitrary).
8 In Book XII of the Anaects, Confucius is said to have asserted that, if he were asked
to administer the country, his first action would be to correct language usage. "If language
is incorrect, then what is said does not concord with what was meant; and if what is said
does not concord with what was meant, what is to be done cannot be effected." THE ANAincrs OF CoNFUCxUs 171 (Arthur Waley trans., 1938).
9 Hsin Tzu elaborated upon the brief Analects passage in his extended essay, "Rectifing Names." See HSON Tzu, supranote 1, at 139-56.
10
The Chinese term for the rectification of names, zheng ming, is evocative in that its
first character, zheng; literally means to make upright or true, with connotations of making
something physically straight, such as a right angle.
11 Held at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, the conference entitled
"Chinese Law: A Re-examination of the Field: Theoretical and Methodological Approaches
to the Study of Chinese Law" (Mar. 22-28, 1993), was the first major conference on imperial Chinese law in recent years.
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odological anxiety in Chinese legal studies is partly a function of the
early stage of development of the field as a sub-discipline. Modem
Chinese legal studies developed as an outgrowth of area studies programs in a few research universities during the 1960s. 12 The pioneering scholars in the field focussed on descriptive studies of various
aspects of the Chinese legal system, using Western legal terminology
in making comparative observations about Chinese legal institutions
and practice.18 In the 1990s, however, a second generation of scholars, many with these pioneering scholars as their mentors, is currently
engaged in the field of Chinese legal studies. Unlike the work of the
first generation of Chinese legal scholars, however, the work of the
second generation scholars must deal not only with the primary
source material in the field, but also with the prior interpretations of
that subject matter by their mentors. Contemporary Chinese legal
scholarship is no longer being written on a blank slate; rather, the
scholar at every turn is disconcerted to find the intellectual graffiti,
"Kilroy was here"-although in the case of Chinese legal studies, the
graffiti is apt to read not "Kilroy" but "Li," 14 or "Lubman,"15 or "Co-

12 For an overview of the history of the development of Chinese legal studies in the
United States, see Stanley B. Lubman, Studying Contemporary Chinese Law: Limits, Possibilities
and Strategy, 39 AM.J. COMP. L. 293 (1991); Stanley Lubman, Western Scholarship on Chinese
Law: Past Accomplishments and Present Challenges, 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 83 (1983)
[hereinafter Lubman, Western Scholarship].
13 Stanley Lubman characterized this work as displaying a "tendency to couch questions about Chinese law in terms of intellectual categories derived from Anglo-American
law .... " Lubman, Western Scholarship, supranote 12, at 98.
14 During this period, Victor Li was professor of Chinese law at the University of Michigan, Columbia University, and Stanford. Among the scholarly works of Victor Li are DONALD J. LEWIS & VICTOR H. LI, MAJOR LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: A
PRELIMINARY INDEX AN COLLECTION OF LEGAL DocuMENTs (1984); VICTOR H. Li, DE-RECOGNIZING TAIWAN: THE LEGAL PROBLEMS (1977); THE FUTuRE OF TAIWAN: A DIFFERENCE OF
OPINION (Victor H. Li ed., 1980); LAW AND POLITICS IN CHNA'S FOREIGN TRADE (Victor H.
Li ed., 1977); VicTOR H. Li, LAw WrrHOuT LAWvYERs: A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF LAW IN CHINA
AND THE UNITED STATES (1978); Victor Li, Human Rights in a Chinese Context, in THE CHINA
DIFFERENCE 219 (Ross Terrill ed., 1979); Victor H. Li, The Use of Suroey Interviewing in Research on Communist Chinese Law, in CONTEMPORARY CHINESE LAw: RESEARCH PROBLEMS AND
PERSPECrIVs 118 (Jerome A. Cohen ed., 1970).
15 Stanley Lubman taught Chinese law at the University of California at Berkeley during this period. In addition to his works cited supra note 12, his scholarly contributions to
Chinese legal studies include Stanley B. Lubman, EmergingFunctionsof FormalLegal Institutions in China'sModernization, 2 CHINA L. RT. 195 (Fall 1983); Stanley Lubman, Form and
Function in the Chinese CriminalProcess, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 535 (1969); Stanley B. Lubman,
Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in Communist China, 55 CAL. L. REv. 1284
(1967); Stanley B. Lubman, Trade Contracts and Technology Licensing, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF
DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA (Jerome A. Cohen ed., 1983).
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hen,"' 6 or 'Jones."' 7 In examining nearly any major aspect of the Chinese legal order, then, scholars must now maintain a double focusconfronting these earlier writings on the subject in question as well as
putting forward their own interpretations of the Chinese legal practice or institution.' 8 Contemporary Chinese legal scholars have attacked the methodological premises of earlier work in the field,
particularly taking exception to the use of Western legal constructs in

16 Jerome A. Cohen initially taught at the University of California at Berkeley during
the early 1960s and was then for many years professor of law and director of the Harvard
Law School's East Asian Legal Studies Program. Among Cohen's many scholarly works are
JEROME A. COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949-1963
(1968); JEROME A. COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU, PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAw: A
DOCUMENTARY STUDY (1974); Jerome A. Cohen, China's Changing Constitution, 76 CHINA Q.
794 (1978);Jerome A. Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve ofModernization, 54 CAL. L. REXV.
1201 (1966);Jerome A. Cohen, Continuity and Change in China: Some "LawDay" Thoughts, 24
S.C. L. REv. 3 (1972); Jerome A. Cohen, DraftingPeople's Mediation Rules, in THE Crn, IN
COMMUNIST CHINA 29 (John W. Lewis ed., 1971); Jerome A. Cohen, Due Process? in THE
CHINA DIFFERENCE 237 (Ross Terrill ed., 1979);Jerome A. Cohen, Interviewing Chinese Reft-

gees: IndispensibleAid to Legal Research on China in Contemporary Chinese Law: Research
Problems and Perspectives 84 (Jerome A. Cohen ed., 1970); Jerome A. Cohen, Reflections
on the CriminalProcess in China, 68J. Cram. L. & CIMINOLOGY 323 (1977);Jerome A. Cohen,
The Chinese Communist Party and Judicial Independence': 1949-1959, 82 HARv. L. REv. 967

(1969). Professor Cohen has also edited or co-edited a number of collections on Chinese
law and politics, including CHINA'S P.ACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: SOME CASE STUDIES
(Jerome A. Cohen ed., 1972); CONTEMPORARY CHINESE LAW: RESEARCH PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTrES (Jerome A. Cohen ed., 1970); CONTRACT LAwS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA (Jerome A. Cohen ed., 1988); THE DYNAMICS OF CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jerome A. Cohen ed., 1970); EssAYs IN CHINA'S LEGAL TRADITION (Jerome A. Cohen et al.
eds., 1980). Professor Cohen currently teaches Chinese law at New York University Law
School.
17 Professor William C. Jones is a professor emeritus of law at Washington University
in St. Louis where he held a chaired position for many years. Among the scholarly contributions to the field by ProfessorJones are BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW INCHINA (William
C. Jones ed., 1989); THE GREAT QING CODE (William C. Jones trans., 1994); William C.

Jones, AnApproach to ChineseLaw,4 REv. SOCIALST L. 3 (1978); William C.Jones, Approaches
to ChineseLaw: A Reply to Comments by Dr.F. Minzr4 4 REv. SOcauST L. 329 (1978); William
C.Jones, A Translationof the FourthDraft Civil Code (June 1982) of the People'sRepublic of China,
10 REv. SocIaLISr L. 193 (1984); William C. Jones, Civil Law in China 18 CHINESE L. &

GOV'T 7 (1985-86); William C.Jones, Collection of Civil Law Casesfrom the Peoples Republic of
China 10 REv. Sociusr L. 169 (1984); William C.Jones, On the Campaign Trail in China, 5
REv. SocrArusr L. 457 (1979); William C.Jones, Reflections on the Modern Chinese Legal System,
59 WASH. U. L.Q. 1221 (1982); William C.Jones, Some QuestionsRegarding the Significance of
the GeneralProvisions of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China, 28 HARv. INT'L LJ. 309
(1987); William C. Jones, Studying the Ch'ing Code-The Ta Ch'ingL-aL, 22 AM. J. OF COMP.
L. 330 (1974); William C. Jones, Theft in the Qing Code; 30 Am. J. Comp. L. 499 (1982).
ProfessorJones's significance to the field of Chinese law is demonstrated by the tribute to
him at 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 541 (1996).
18 Anthropologist James Clifford has addressed a similar problem in contemporary
anthropology, discussing what he terms the "intertextual predicament" of writing in an
area already saturated with the texts of preceding generations of scholars. James Clifford,
On EthnographicAllegoy, in WRITING CULTURE: THE POETICS AND POLrrICs OF ETHNOGRAPHY
98, 117 (James Clifford & George E. Marcus eds., 1986) [hereinafter WRrrING CULTURE].

24
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the study of Chinese law.19 Consequently, questions of appropriate
methodology currently loom large in Chinese legal studies.
A preoccupation with methodological issues is not, however, peculiar to Chinese legal studies. Rather, all contemporary academic
discourse is subject to the challenge of postmodern thought to established disciplinary methodologies, inducing a kind of intellectual vertigo in current scholarship. 20 Legal studies are not exempt from this
generally prevalent turn within the academy. 2 1 Although
19 See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, InterpretingSacred Texts: PreliminaryReflections on ConstitutionalDiscoursein China, 43 HASTINGS LJ. 273, 278 (1992) (criticizingJerome Cohen for
applying Western notions of constitutional practice to Chinese constitutions); Lubman,
Western Scholarship, supra note 12, at 98 (noting prevalence of this criticism of preceding
work in the field by second generation Chinese legal studies scholarship). See generally

William Alford, The Inscrutable Occidental?Implications of Roberto Unger's Uses and Abuses of the
ChinesePast, 64 TEx. L. REv. 915 (1986) (criticizing Unger for using Western legal categories in analysis of imperial Chinese law).
20 For a representative, but by no means exhaustive, sampling of writings indicative of
the impact of postmodernism on various academic disciplines, see TEIxrNArONAL/INTERTEXTUAL RELATIONS: POSTMODERN READINGS OF WORLD PoLrIcs (James Der Derian &

Michael J. Shapiro eds., 1989) (postmodernism and international politics); E.W. SOJA,
POSTMODERN GEOGRAPHIES: THE REASSERTION OF SPACE IN CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY (1989)
(postmodernism and geography); F.R. Ankersmit, Historiography and Postmodernism, 28
HIsr. & THEORY 137 (1989) (postmodernism and history); Zygmunt Bauman, Philosophical
Affinities of Postmodern Sociology, 38 Soc. REV. 411 (1990) (postmodernism and sociology);
Rachel T. Hare-Mustin & Jeanne Marecek, The Meaning of Difference: Gender Theory,
Postmodernism, and Psychology, 43 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 455 (1988) (postmodernism and psychology); P. Steven Sangren, Rhetoric and the Authority of Ethnography: "Postmodernismand the
Social Reproduction of Texts, "29 CURRENT ANTHRO. 405 (1988) (postmodernism and anthropology); Stephen K. White, Poststructuralism and PoliticalReflection, 16 POL. THEORY 186
(1988) (postmodernism and political theory). Postmodernism has also posed a challenge
to contemporary political and social theory. See, e.g., FE1INISM/POSTMODERNISM (LindaJ.
Nicholson ed., 1990); JAN, FLAx, THINKING FRAGMENTS: PSYCHOANALYSIS, FEMINISM, AND
POSTMODERNISM IN THE CoNTEMPoRARY WEST (1990); CHRIS WEEDON, FEMINIST PRACTICE

AND POsTsTRuCrUlA.ST THEORY (1987) (postmodernism and feminist theory); ANTHONY
WOODIWISs, SOCIAL THEORY AFTER POSTMODERNISM: RETHINKING PRODUCTION, LAW, AND

CLASS (1990) (postmodernism and social theory); Alex Callinicos, Postmodernism, Post-Structuralism, Post-Marxism? 2 THEORY, CULTURE & SoCIETY 85 (1985) (postmodernism and
Marxist theory); Norman K Denzin, Postmodern Social Theory, 4 Soc. THEORY 194 (1986);
Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Postmodernism, 176 NEw LEFT REV. 31 (1989). Lest one be
tempted to think that postmodernism's influence within the academy is limited to the
humanities and social sciences, I hasten to add that even the sciences have not gone untouched by the postmodern turn in the academy. See, e.g., BRUCE GREGORY, INVENTING
REAT.

PHYSICS AS LANGUAGE (1988) (postmodernism and physics); Charles Birch, Eight

Fallaciesof the Modern World and Five Axioms for a Postmodern Worldview, 32 PERSP. INBIOLOGY
& MED. 12 (1988) (postmodernism and biological sciences); David A. Platten, Postmodern
Engineering,56 Civ. ENGINEERING 84 (1986) (postmodernism and engineering); J.H. Wik-

strom, Moving into the Postmodem World, 85 J. FORESTRY 65 (1987) (postmodemism and
forestry). See generallyTHE REENCHANTmENT OF SCIENCE: POSTMODERN PROPOSALS (David R.
Griffin ed., 1988) (postmodernism and the sciences). It would appear that postmodernism
is a convocation to which no discipline can avoid sending a delegation.
21
Postmodern legal theory has been the subject of a number of recent books, including CosTAS DouzNAS & RONNIE WARRINGTON, POSTMODERN JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAw OF
TEXT IN THE TEXTS OF LAw (1991); PETER GOODRICH, LANGUAGES OF LAw. FROM LOGICS OF

MEMORY TO NoMADic MASKS (1990);

LEGALrrY AND

ILLEGALrnY. SENIOTICS, POSTMODERNISM
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postmodernism is notoriously difficult to define with any degree of
consistency,2 2 the postmodern sensibility can fairly be characterized as
one of epistemological anti-foundationalism, rejecting the belief that
human knowledge can be grounded in eternal or universal truths. 23
Instead, postmodern claims to knowledge are, at best, only partial in
nature, and can only be validated within a specific context. The insistence of postmodernism that commonly accepted categories of knowledge are humanly created artefacts, discursively produced by
culturally and historically situated participants, creates a nearly insurmountable methodological hurdle for the comparative legal scholar.
If a category such as "law" is seen as a culturally contingent product of
our own Western discursive practices, then how can the term "law" be
meaningfully used to label an aspect of Chinese social reality?
Postmodernism thus provokes the comparativist to ask whether it is
misleading or even meaningless to speak of Chinese "law."
Postmodern thinking poses an even more fundamental methodological challenge to the comparativist, however, in that postmodernism
views language not as a transparent medium for the representation of
reality, but rather as the site for the discursively mediated struggle
over meaning and truth.24 Hence, representation itself, the very stock
AND LAW (W. RichardJanikowski & Dragan Milovanovic eds., 1995); DRAGAN MrLovANOvic,
POSTMoDEN LAw AN DISORDER: PsvcHoANALYnc SEMIoncs, CHAOS AND JURIDIC EXEGESES
(1992); POST-MODERN LAW. ENUGHTENMENT, REVOLUTION AND THE DEATH OF MAN
(Anthony Carty ed., 1990).
22 Nevertheless, many have attempted to do so with a striking lack of consistency in
their definitive statements of the postmodem. See, e.g., THE ANTI-AEsTHETIc: ESSAYS ON
POsTMODERN

CULTURE

(Hal Foster

ed.,

1983); DAVID HARVEy,

THE

CONDITION OF

POSTMODERNIT. AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS OF CULTURAL CHANGE (1989); ANDREAS
HuYSSEN, AFTER THE GREAT DIVIDE: MODERNISM, MASS CULTURE, POSTMODERNISM (1986);
JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE (1984);
POSTMODERNISM AND CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY (Hugh J. Silverman & Donn Welton eds.,
1988); THEORIES OF MODERNITY AND POSTMODERm'Y (Bryan S. Turner ed., 1990); GIANNI
VATFIMO, THE END OF MODERNITY- NIHILISM AND HERmENEUTIcs IN POT-MODERN CULTURE

(1988); FredricJameson, The Politicrs of Theory: IdeologicalPositionsin the PostmodernismDebate,
33 NEw GERMAN CRITIQUE 53 (1984); FredricJameson, Postmodernism, or the CulturalLogic of
Late Capitalism, 146 NEW LEFT REv. 53 (1984).
23 In the words of Professor Stanley Fish, a leading exponent of this radical epistemological skepticism:
Anti-foundationalism teaches that questions of fact, truth, correctness, validity, and clarity can neither be posed nor answered in reference to some
extracontextual, ahistorical, nonsituational reality, or rule, or law, or value;
rather, anti-foundationalism asserts, all of these matters are intelligible and
debatable only within the precincts of the contexts or situations or paradigms or communities that give them their local and changeable shape.

STANLEY FISH, Antifoundationalism, Theory Hope, and the Teaching of Composition, in DOING
WHAT CoMEs NATURALLY. CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY
AND LEGAL STUDIES 342, 344 (1989).

24 For further reflections on the discursively mediated reciprocity of knowledge and
power, see MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (A.M. Sheridan Smith
trans., 1973) (1972); MicHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND
OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977 (Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980) (1972).
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in trade of the social scientist, is highly problematic in postmodern
thought.25 If representation as a general matter is suspect, the further
problem of the representation of the "other" by those situated within
the dominant discourse is considered to be a matter fraught with additional philosophical and political dimensions.2 6 Is it any wonder that
some postmodern scholars despair of the possibility of achieving
"true" representation of other cultures within our scholarly discourse,
asserting that "[no] cultural tradition can analytically encompass the
27
discourse of another cultural tradition"?
Although extreme skepticism as to the possibility of accurate representation of the foreign may be particularly emblematic of contemporary postmodernism, the problem of how to achieve cross-cultural
understanding has long bedeviled scholars in a variety of disciplines.
As a preliminary matter,2 8 there are formidable problems inherent in
linguistic translation when the language of the subject of study differs
from that of the researcher.2 9 In any language, individual words bear
not only their primary meanings but also layers of nuance, slowly built
up as a result of the historical context in which the word has been
used in the culture. Thus, even assuming that the translating scholar
can locate a word in her own language of equivalent primary meaning
to the target word, the connotations attached to the equivalent words
are unlikely to be the same in each language. These difficulties are
compounded when the languages are as syntactically, lexically, and
semantically dissimilar as English is from Chinese.3 0 Even when the
25

See HANS KELLNER, LANGUAGE AND HISTORICAL REPRESENTATION: GETTING THE STORY

CROOKED (1989); HAYDEN WHITE, The Fictions of FactualRepresentation, in TROPICS OF DISCOURSE: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL CErICiSM 121-34 (1978).
26
For a critique of the representation of subordinated peoples within Western schol-

arship, see EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978); Gayatri Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak ,
in MARXISM AND THE INTERPRErATON OF CULTURE 271 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg
eds., 1988).
27 Stephen Tyler, The Poetic Turn in PostmodernAnthropology: The Poetry of PaulFriedrich,
86 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 328, 328 (1984).
28 I am ignoring the even more preliminary question of whether, and how, people
can achieve intersubjective understanding at all. For a recent attempt to unravel that longstanding philosophical tangle, see TALBOTJ. TAYLOR, MUTUAL MSUNDERSTANDING: ScEPTICISM AND THE THEORIZING OF LANGUAGE AND INTERPRETATION

(1992).

29 Translation, or the transmission of meaning encoded within one language into an
equivalent representation of that meaning in another language, presents both philosophical and linguistic problems that are beyond the scope of this Article. For the classic treatment of translation as a problem in the philosophy of language, see generally WILLARD
V.0. QUINE, WORD AND OBJEar (1960) (outlining the indeterminacy thesis of translation).
For an elaboration of the technical linguistic issues presented by translation, see generally
ROGER T. BELL, TRANSLATION AND TRANSLATING: THEORY AND PRArxcE (1991).
30 For a sensitive discussion of the issue, including aspects which are unique to the
Chinese language, see Achilles Fang, Some Reflections on the Difficulty of Translation,in STUDIES IN CHINESE THOUGHT 263 (Arthur F. Wright ed., 1953); I. A. Richards, Toward a Theory of
Translating, in STUDIES IN CHINESE THOUGHT, supr, at 247; Arthur F. Wright, The Chinese
Language and ForeignIdeas, in STUDIES IN CHINESE THOUGHT, supra at 286. The problem of
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scholar uses meticulous care in her translation, the effect is similar to
that produced by the cook who ventures to reproduce an ethnic dish
from a recipe but who is forced to substitute various local foodstuffs
for the authentic ethnic ingredients. The finished product may be
recognizable as a good-faith attempt at the dish in question, but the
subtle flavors are invariably all wrong.
The difficulties in linguistic translation, formidable though they
are, constitute only one aspect of the problem of the representation of
foreign cultures within our scholarly discourse, a problem facing historians and anthropologists as well as comparative legal scholars. As
anthropologist Vincent Crapanzano explained, "The ethnographer is
caught in a... paradox.... He must render the foreign familiar and
preserve its very foreignness at one and the same time."3' The scholar
must strive to achieve a comprehensible representation of the other,
all the while attempting to maintain the essence of what is incommensurable in the other. Even leaving aside the contemporary
postmodem crisis of representation that generally problematizes the
relationship of representation with reality,3 2 the scholar who undertakes the analytic characterization of another culture is faced with a
daunting task.
Legal anthropologists have long struggled with the problem of
choosing a vocabulary with which to describe non-Western legal systems. Some, including Paul Bohannan, insisted on using native words
for legal concepts as much as possible, because they believed that
Western terminology was inescapably misleading in its connotations.35
Others, most notably Max Gluckman, thought that a universally applicable legal terminology, which might or might not happen to correspond with Western legal vocabulary, did exist and could adequately
describe non-Western legal systems.34 This debate over appropriate
language is grounded in a yet deeper disagreement concerning the
nature of law within a culture. Those anthropologists and comparaslippage in translation in using Western terminiology for Chinese ideas has been a perenially vexing one for scholarship in Western languages on Chinese philosophy as well. See
Lin Tongqi et al., Chinese Philosophy: A PhilosophicalEssay on the "State-of-the-Art" 54 J. oF
AsiAN STUD. 727, 750-52 (1995).
31 Vincent Crapanzano, Hermes'Dilemm: The Masking of Subversion in EthnographicDescription, in WarrNG CuLuaRE, supra note 18, at 51, 52.
32

See, Scorr LASH,

SOCIOLOGY OF POSTMODENMSM 12

(1990)

(discussing how

postmodern thought problematizes the relationship between signifier, signified, and referent). For a specific consideration of the impact of postmodern critique on the representation of foreign cultures by anthropologists, see Paul Rabinow, Representations Are Social
Facts: Modernity and Post-Modernity in Anthropology, in WarnsG CULTURE, supra note 18, at

234.
33

See Paul Bohannan, Ethnography and Comparisonin LegalAnthropology, in LAW INCur-

TURESAND Socrn 401 (Laura Nader ed., 1969).
34 See Max Gluckman, Concepts in the ComparativeStudy of Tribal Law,in LAw rN CULTuRE

AND SociEry, supra note 33, at 349.
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tive legal scholars who side with Bohannan assume that every culture
has a unique legal order, with distinctive legal institutions, practices,
and ideology that evolve in the context of its overall social order.
Those scholars who agree with Gluckman, on the other hand, imagine
that the legal order occupies the same structural niche in every culture, so that the superstructural details of legal systems may vary dramatically from society to society, but the fundamental structural
functions of all legal orders are universally identical.
I count myself among those who, with Bohannan, consider any
culture's legal order a unique and finely tuned product of the overall
cultural context in which it is embedded. At the same time, legal discourse and practice act as a constituent thread in the fabric of meaning, belief, and social relations that make up that singular social
world. In the words of Clifford Geertz, "Law... is local knowledge;
local not just as to place, time, class, and variety of issue, but as to
accent-vernacular characterizations of what happens connected to
vernacular imaginings of what can."3 5 In this regard, a culture's legal

order is a highly particularized local form of discourse, and a comparativist must attend to the ways in which the local legal sensibility
informs the practices and institutions through which that sensibility
finds concrete realization. In doing so, the comparativist must bear in
mind the complexity of the legal order of any culture. A legal order
simultaneously encompasses systems of political arrangements, social
relations, interpersonal interactional practices, economic processes,
cultural categorizations, normative beliefs, psychological habits, philosophical perspectives, and ideological values. All of these aspects of a
legal order are constituted through distinctive discursive practices,
and it is in these discursive practices that law provides another arena
for contests over social meaning within a culture.8 6 Chinese culture,
like other cultures, is not a consistent homogeneous entity,37 but
35 CLIFoRD GEERTZ, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in ComparativePerspective, in LocAL
KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER EssAys IN INTERPRErVE ANTHROPOLOGY 167, 215 (1983) [hereinafter
LocAL KNOWLEDGE].

36 Anthropologist Sally Merry makes this point in her study of cross-cultural dispute
resolution:
Disputing, however, is cultural behavior .... Parties to a dispute operate
within systems of meaning; they seek ways of doing things that seem right,
normal, or fair, often acting out of habit or moral conviction. The normative framework shapes the way people conceptualize problems, the ways
they pursue them, and the kinds of solutions they look for.
Sally E. Merry, Disputing Without Culture, 100 HAxv. L. REv. 2057, 2063 (1987) (citing Merry
& Sibley, What do Plaintiffis Want? Reexamining the Concept ofDispute, 9Jusr. Sys.J. 151, 15354, 169-77 (1984)).
37

Few, if any, societies are perfectly uniform and coherent entities. As Alan Hunt

once observed, "Consistent world views may exist, but they must be treated as special or
exceptional cases." Alan Hunt, The Ideology of Law: Advances and Problems in Recent Applications of the Concept of Ideology to the Analysis of Law, 19 L & Soc'y Rxv. 11, 13 (1985).
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rather a complexly overdetermined locus in which a variety of legal
strategies and attitudes are constantly undergoing contest and
change. Given the size and heterogeneity of China 8-considering its
regional diversity, the social differences between its urban and rural
populations, the divergence between elite and popular culture, and
the diachronic variation over its long history-it would be surprising
not to find evidence of legal pluralism in China.3 9 Therefore, it is in a
sense misleading to speak of "Chinese" law as though China were a
uniform and unchanging entity. Provided the scholar keeps the
above qualifications in mind, however, Chinese culture does represent
a social order with sufficient coherence for scholars to develop useful
generalizations about an imperial Chinese legal sensibility and its attendant legal order.
Because law is recursive, that is, it is both a reflection of a cultural
order and at the same time a producer of that culture, any interpretive project in Chinese legal studies must consequently alternate between a general focus on the Chinese cultural context and a specific
focus on legal practices and discourse. In other words, to understand
the Chinese legal order, one must understand more generally the categories of meaning through which the Chinese make sense of their
lives and experiences. Conversely, one cannot fully appreciate the
overall Chinese cultural context without developing a sense of the
Chinese legal sensibility, the legal practices and discourses which it
informs, and the place of that legal order in the larger social world.4 0
The recognition that law cannot be studied in vitro, that it must be
analyzed within the context of the whole cultural organism, suggests
that Bohannan is right to be skeptical about the use of Western legal
terminology in studying non-Western legal orders. Consequently, it is
not sufficient merely to map Chinese legal practices and ideologies
38 In recognition of the geographic heterogeneity of China, many historians explicitly
frame their work as local studies, contrasting specific local conditions and characteristics
with those that are more generally Chinese. See, e.g., HnrtYJ. BEATTIE, LAND AND LINEAGE
IN CHINA: A SrUny OF T'UNG-CH'ENG CouNw, ANHWEI, IN THE MING AND CH'ING DYNASmES
(1979); ROBERT B. MARxs, RURAL REVOLUTION IN SOUTH CHm PEAsANTS AND THE MAKING
OF HISTORY IN HAmNG CouN
1570-930 (1984).
39 In using the term "legal pluralism," I do not mean to claim that imperial China had
a synchronic multiplicity of formal legal institutions, as might be suggested by M.B.
Hooker's use of the term to mean "multiple systems of legal obligation existing within the
confines of the state." M.B. HooIER, LEGAL PLURALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO COLONIAL

AND NEOCOLONIAL LAws 2 (1975). Rather, I am using the term "legal pluralism" in the

broader sense of a "normative heterogeneity attendant upon the fact that social action
always takes place in a context of multiple, overlapping 'semi-autonomous social
fields'... ." John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism? 24J. OF LEG. PLURALISM 1, 38 (1986).
40 This parallels the position taken by Clifford Geertz: "Taken together, these two
propositions, that law is local knowledge not placeless principle and that it is constructive
of social life not reflective, or anyway not just reflective, of it, lead on to a rather unorthodox view of what the comparative study of it should consist in: cultural translation."
Geertz, supra note 35, at 218.
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onto familiar Western conceptual territory. Comparative law, warns
Geertz, is notjust "amatter of locating identical phenomena masquer41
ading under different names."
By contrast, comparative legal studies that attempt to identify universal legal principles and practices in the non-Western legal system
present three interrelated pitfalls. One problem with using Western
legal concepts in the study of non-Western law is that doing so encourages comparativist scholars to ask the wrong questions and thereby
pose a research agenda that is detached from the subject of study.
Universal, generally Western, conceptual frameworks in legal studies
function as paradigms in the production of legal scholarship. All
scholarly inquiry proceeds on the basis of paradigms, or meta-theories
about the nature of the object of study, which then allow us to generate specific theories commensurate with the paradigms. These paradigmatic conceptual constructs organize and constrain scholarly
research, making some questions seem natural-leading to potentially
fruitful avenues of research-and others irrelevant, dead-end, perverse, or even literally unthinkable. 42 Because the conceptual constructs that we use determine the way in which we perceive the subject
we are studying, and consequently the issues that we imagine to be
worth investigating, our conceptual paradigms must arise directly
from the subject matter in question. Thus, when we instead impose
Western legal conceptual paradigms upon Chinese legal discourse
and practice, we risk asking and answering questions that are at best
irrelevant and at worst actively misleading in our quest to understand
the Chinese legal order.
A second corollary pitfall in using constructs derived from Western legal discourse in the study of non-Western law is that these alien
conceptual paradigms will influence the way in which we interpret the
data we observe. Conceptual paradigms provide the scholar with a
preconceived conceptual framework that can cause misinterpretation
of the observed data because of the well-known truism that people
tend to see what they expect to see. Paradigmatic conceptual
frameworks tend to make the scholar observe what the paradigm
predicts, sometimes literally causing the scholar to see things that do
not exist. To take one notorious example, Western natural science of
the Enlightenment hypothesized-incorrectly, as it turned out-that
males created the human fetus without any biological contribution
from the female. As a result of the power of this paradigmatic suggestion, scientists even "observed" miniature, perfectly-formed humans
41 Geertz, supra note 35, at 216.
42 Cf.THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCrURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970)
(positing that scientific inquiry and experimentation is similarly constrained by scientific

paradigms).
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curled within the heads of spermatozoa when examined under primitive microscopes. 43 In a similar-if less overtly visible-fashion, paradigmatic legal frameworks tend to organize our own legal studies
research, not only dictating the significant questions, but also determining in no small measure the answers ultimately discovered.
Yet a third pitfall in using Western-derived legal terminology is
that it obscures the normative framework that is presupposed within
the Western legal vocabulary used in our scholarship, a framework
that fails to reflect the normative universe inherent in the foreign
legal order. In other words, the imposition of a Western legal framework onto a study of the Chinese legal system is misleading not only as
to the structure and dynamics of Chinese legal practice, but also as to
the nature of the Chinese normative legal order. The very concepts
and categories with which the scholar organizes this purportedly universal legal framework are freighted with culturally contingent normative baggage. No matter how neutral and objective descriptive legal
categories may appear, they are themselves creatures of a historically
and culturally contingent social world, bearing the normative patina
of the context from which they were derived.44 Just as fish always in
the sea have no consciousness of being wet, scholars always immersed
in the ocean of their own normative order may well be unaware that
this order permeates the very conceptual tools that they use in attempting to understand the other.
These pitfalls for the comparativist that I have described all
played a role in generating the question my student asked concerning
Han Dynasty contract law. His misguided question about promissory
estoppel was in some sense the natural outcome of our classroom
adoption of the Western contract paradigm to analyze the legal practice and discursive world of Han Dynasty China. Having mapped the
known concept "contract" onto the unfamiliar world of Han Dynasty
legal obligations, the student unsurprisingly asked a question based
on his pre-conceived conceptual framework, rather than a question
grounded in an understanding of the Chinese legal order on its own
terms. Despite having read concrete data describing the practice and
ideology of obligations in Han Dynasty China, the student's analytic
43
Such eminent natural scientists as Leeuwenhoek, Andry, Gautier, Dalenpatius, and
Hartsoeker all claimed to have observed tiny homunculi curled up in the heads of spermatozoa. SeeJOSEPH NEEDHAM, A HisTORY OF EMBRYOLOGy 205-06 (1959). This exemplifies
the Kuhnian description of "normal" science, in which theory tends to determine data
rather than the other way around. See KtnN, supra note 42, at 24, 64.
44 For a persuasive discussion of how normative content permeates even obstensibly
purely descriptive legal scholarship see Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politicsof Form, 139
U. PA. L. Rmr. 801, 811-14 (1991) (noting that "the context and the legal unconscious ...
perform normative work in selecting, establishing, and organizing the so-called 'descriptive' categories deployed in legal thought.").
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faculties succumbed to the overpowering paradigm of contract as he
already understood it.
Moreover, the imposition of the Anglo-American idea of "contract" onto the Chinese legal order silently infected the student's understanding of the imperial Chinese law of obligations with a host of
Western ideological and normative assumptions implicit within the
contract construct. Calling a legal practice a "contract," for instance,
automatically imports a set of largely invisible and unexamined AngloAmerican conceptual assumptions. These include not only juridical
constructs such as state-mediated enforceability of the terms of the socalled contract, circumscribed by judicial unwillingness to reform contracts by varying the terms agreed upon in the contract instrument,45
but also Western liberal normative concepts such as the primacy of
autonomous individuals exercising unfettered free will in their bargaining over contract terms in arms' length transactions. Yet these
normative implications of the term "contract" are entirely foreign to
the Chinese legal sensibility.4 It is always possible, of course, to disclaim explicitly the intentional importation of this Western cultural
baggage when adopting Western legal terminology to analyze a foreign legal system. Doing so, however, requires both author and audience consciously to foreground these multi-leveled assumptions and
then back them out of their understanding of the foreign legal order,
a heroic intellectual feat of which few, if any, of us are capable.
What alternatives, then, do we have to using inappropriate and
misleading Western legal terminology in the comparative study of law?
45
In classical Anglo-American contract doctrine, the judiciary is seen as powerless to
rewrite contracts and include contract terms to which the parties have not earlier bound
themselves, even if subsequent events radically change the factual situation of the parties.
Rather, contract doctrine limits the role of the court either to enforcing the contract as
written or voiding the contract. For an analysis exemplifying this classical normative posture, seeJohn P. DawsonJudicial Revision ofFrustratedContracts: The UnitedStates, 64 B.U. L.
REv. 1, 26-38 (1984) (criticizing the anomalous case of Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex
Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980), and arguing that courts have no authority to
rewrite contracts and vary their terms even if the purpose of a contract has been frustrated,
and asserting that the proper authority of the court is limited to full enforcement or complete voidance of the contract).
46
To illustrate, even contemporary Chinese contract law manifests normative attitudes radically different from those assumed in Anglo-American contract doctrine. Compare the normative stance implicit in Dawson, supra note 45, with that described in Phyllis
L. Chang, DecidingDisputes: Factors That Guide Chinese Courts in the Adjudication of Rural Responsibility Contract Disputes, 52 IAw & CoN'TEP. PRoBs. 101, 132-35 (Summer 1989) (observing that Chinese normative principles permitjudicial modification of contract terms as
well as selective refusal to enforce specific contract provisions); see also David Zweig et al.,
Law, Contract, and Economic Modernization: Lessons from the Recent Chinese Rural Reforms, 23
STAN.J. Iwr'L L 319, 340-55 (1987) (providing examples ofjudicial reformation of vague
or ambiguous contracts as well as cases involvingjudicially created contract terms imposed
upon one or more parties to the contract, including judicial imposition of conditions for
future performance between the parties).
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The search for an answer to that question returns us squarely to the
problem of methodological stance. Again, I suggest that anthropology provides a serviceable methodological framework for the comparative study of law in its contrasting twin methodological stances, the
so-called emic and etic approaches to cultural studies. 47 This terminology, coined by Kenneth Pike,48 was modelled upon the parallel linguistics terms phonemic and phonetic. 49 Just as phonemic analysis in
linguistics focuses on the linguistically variable significant phonological units for any particular language, emic cultural study examines the
culturally variable aspects of particular cultures. Similarly, phonetic
linguistic analysis is devoted to the study of the all-inclusive inventory
of human sounds available to be used in human languages. Etic cultural study, by analogy, undertakes an analysis of a particular culture
in terms of an all-inclusive inventory of categories of cultural analysis.
An emic approach to cultural study presumes that every culture is an
internally consistent system best studied on its own terms, whereas etic
study presumes that using universal frameworks of analysis applicable
to any culture is the most appropriate methodology to adopt in cultural study. Emic implies relativism, seeing things "from the native's
point of view;" etic implies empiricism, a belief in the validity of objective data and universal modes of analysis. Emic cultural study is essentially interpretive, positing a culturally specific social construction of
reality; etic cultural study is essentially analytic, positing an objective
scientifically verifiable reality.
Cultural studies must begin with etic analysis whatever the methodological stance preferred by the researcher for her eventual finished product. Thomas Kuhn's paradigm model of scholarly research
suggests that it can hardly be otherwise. 50 Without the imposition of
some categorization onto data, that data remains meaningless to the
observer. Yet any categorization necessarily involves making a priori
assumptions about the appropriate meaning to be accorded to that
data. Because there is no theory-free way in which to observe and
analyze data, one must by default begin research in an etic fashion.
Although one must begin any study of social life with etic categories,
the ultimate point of one's work in cultural studies ought to be to
47 The emic versus etic dichotomy has been extremely influential as a heuristic device
in anthropological methodology. See CAROL M. EASTMAN, ASPECS OF LANGUAGE AND CULTURE 25-27 (2d ed. 1990).
48

See KENNETH L. PIKE, LANGUAGE IN RELATION TO A UNIFIED THEORY OF THE STRUC-

TURE OF HuMAN BEHAVIOR

37-39 (2d ed. 1967).
49 In linguistics, phonetic analysis refers to the study of the range of vocal sounds
from which all languages are constructed; in contrast, phonemic analysis is the study of the
set of significant sounds used in any particular language. SeeJoN LYONs, LANGUAGE AND
LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 66-98 (1981).
50 See KUHN, supra note 42.
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supplant these default etic categories with emic interpretive constructs
that better reflect the worldview of the studied order.
A useful starting point in an emic study of comparative law is to
locate those key words within the foreign legal discourse that crystalize
the foreign legal sensibility. True, there will probably not be a tidy
English language equivalent for the terms in question, 51 but the mere
fact that the legal vocabularies of two languages may not contain completely commensurate terminology does not mean that it is impossible
to communicate the sense of foreign legal terms in English. For example, although it may be the case that Eskimo languages have a
larger vocabulary to name different kinds of snow than does English,
one can nevertheless convey the meaning of any of the Eskimo terms
for snow to an English-speaker by using phrases such as "icy snow that
forms crystals," or "heavy snow that is good for making igloos." 52 Admittedly, choosing phrases to translate legal terminology presents
greater difficulty than finding phrases to translate an Eskimo word for
a particular kind of snow because, unlike physical aspects of the natural world, social constructs such as legal categories may be the unique
product of their local human contexts. It is possible, however, to unpack the meaning of a non-Western legal term through a hermeneutic
process of alternating between painstakingly detailed observation of
cultural practice and discourse and the interpretive synthesis of that
raw material. 53 A dazzlingly effective example of this can be found in
Clifford Geertz's essay, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative
51 Except for basic order concepts, different cultures use incommensurate vocabularies to describe the culturally contingent aspects of their social world, so that a concept
from one culture will likely not be "codable" in the language of another. The "codability"
of a language may be increased, however, by various forms of lexical extension, including
adoption of the foreign word into the host language, or by back translation of the foreign
terminology into a neologistic loan expression. See LYONs, supra note 49, at 633-38.
52 The assertion that Eskimo languages have a large number of different words for
snow apparently originated with the turn-of-the century anthropologist and linguist Franz
Boas. Recently it has been suggested that Boas's claim is a product of a naive misunderstanding of the agglutinative nature of syntactic structure in these languages, and that Eskimo languages in fact do not have dozens of different words for snow, as Boas and his
followers maintained. GEOFFREY PULLUM, THE GREAT ESKIMO VocABuLARY HOAX: AND
OTHER IRREVERENT ESSAYS ON THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE 159-71 (1991). Regardless of the
accuracy of this particular example, however, it is still undoubtedly true that the lexicon of
any particular culture will contain the set of words needed for the realization of that culture, and that consequently, cultures with different needs are likely to have correspondingly different vocabularies.
53 Clifford Geertz suggests that this hermeneutical method allows the anthropologist
successfully to represent the other culture within our own discourse. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ,
"From the Native's Point of Vzew": On the Nature of Anthropological Understanding, in LocAr.
KNOWLEDGE, supra note 35, at 55, 69-70. Elsewhere he refers to the process of interpretive

ethnography as relying upon "thick description," or the use of highly contextualized, multilayered narrative description as a prerequisite to interpretive anthropological work. See
Clifford Geertz, Thick Description:Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3-31 (1973).
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Perspective,in which Geertz discursively unpacks the Arabic word haqq,
the Sanskrit word dharma, and the Malay word adatin order to illuminate the Islamic, Indian, and Malaysian legal sensibilities, respectively.5 4 Geertz acknowledges that, in each case, a single term cannot
suffice to completely capture the foreign legal sensibility in question;
a "cycle of terms defining not point concepts but a structure of
ideas-multiple meanings, multiply implicated at multiple levels"
would be preferable. 5 5 Nevertheless, by sensitively considering the
cultural context in which the terms in question are used, and by observing in close detail the cultural practices which they inform, Geertz
conveys to the reader some sense of the particularized legal sensibilities of these non-Western normative worlds.
An example a bit closer to my own disciplinary home territory
would be the interpretive application in imperial Chinese law scholar56
ship of the contrasting and complementary Chinese terms 1i and fa.
Both terms have, over many centuries of use, accrued many layers of
meaning. 57 Li, often translated as ritual or rite, refers to the system of
prescriptive social rules in a Confucian society which together circumscribe appropriate and accepted modes of behavior and define hierarchical social relationships. Being both unwritten and lacking detail, 1i
provides the unchanging basic normative underpinning of the state
and the social order. Fa, on the other hand, was seen as constituting
the positive, humanly created legal code of ancient China. If 1i was
the embodiment of general nonspecific standards of morality, fa was
the codification through written penal codes of detailed rules
designed specifically to regulate and punish antisocial behavior.
Although to some extent the Chinese imperial penal codes can be
seen as a codified realization of the normative aspects of li,58 there is a
fundamental tension between the views of human nature and social
order implicit within each of these competing concepts. A world regulated by 1i is premised upon the view that human nature is essentially
good, and that moral suasion by the state is the appropriate stance for
the inculcation of proper behavior by the population. 59 In contrast,
the world view encompassed byfa is one in which humanity is seen as
See GEERTZ, supra note 35, at 214.
Id. at 185.
56 For a discussion of the roles within the Chinese legal sensibility of these two terms,
see DERK BODDE & CLARENCE MoRRis, LAw IN IMPERIAL CHNA 11-48 (1967); Liang Zhiping,
Explicating SLaw: A ComparativePerspectiveof Chinese and Western Legal Culture, 3 J. CHINESE
L. 55 (1989).
57 The evolution of the meaning of the term fa is outlined in Zhiping, supra note 56,
at 79-91.
58 Bodde and Morris adopt the view that Chinese imperial legal orthodoxy represents
a fulfillment of the spirit of the li through the positive mechanism of legal codes typical of
fa. See BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 56, at 27-48.
59 See id. at 19-23.
54

55
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essentially self-interested, so that natural human selfishness must be
externally controlled by strict punitive controls for misbehavior and
rewards for good behavior.60 Understanding the unresolvable tensions between these two competing normative legal concepts successfully communicates something significant about the imperial Chinese
legal sensibility that sought to incorporate both, and it does so without
rendering that sensibility incomprehensibly alien to the Western observer. The use of this Chinese normative vocabulary, coupled with a
"thick description" of the cultural context in which that vocabulary is
embedded, solves the paradox of the comparativist-it makes the foreign familiar and preserves its essential foreignness at one and the
61
same time.
If adopting an autochthonous, non-Western legal vocabulary
were the only way in which to achieve a legitimate understanding of a
foreign legal order, we comparativists would have our work cut out for
us. After all, as any first year law student could attest, any legal order
is a discursive universe utilizing hundreds, if not thousands, of items
of specialized legal terminology as well as countless ordinary words
that develop specific legal connotations in their use as legal terms of
art. Unpacking the multivalent meanings of these words and situating
them in a "thickly described" cultural context would be the lifework of
more scholars in comparative law than legal academia could ever
support.
Happily, other sources for gaining an understanding of a foreign
legal normative order can be exploited by the comparative legal
scholar. 62 What follows is a discussion of the kinds of sources that
have enriched my own study of imperial Chinese law, a discussion that
I include as an illustrative example of how an emic comparative study
of foreign law might proceed.
One way in which the comparativist can gain considerable insight
into a legal normative order is by considering how law is spoken of in
everyday life. Ordinary Chinese language is particularly rich in proverbs and sayings 63 that express popular attitudes and beliefs about the
entire range of social life and experience. Some of these proverbial
sayings manifest cultural ideals and values concerning the law and
See id. at 23-27.
61 See Crapanzano, supra note 31, at 51-52.
62 In this Article, I emphasize sources available in English language translation. However, the suggestions that I am making apply equally to the larger world of Chinese language resources.
63 Among the types of proverbial expressions used in Chinese are chengyu, or fixed
expressions often of literary origin composed of four or five characters; geyan, or maxims;
yanyu, or proverbial sayings; and xiehouyu, or two part metaphors, sometimes punning, in
which only the first part of the metaphor is usually said aloud, with the second part to be
inferred by the listener. SeeJoHN S. ROHSFNow, A CHINESE-ENGLISH DicrioNAR' oF ENIC60

mAxnc FoLK SIMnEs ix-xv (1991).

1996]

CATEGORIES AND CULTURE

legal institutions. For instance, a number of proverbs6 4 point to legendaryJudge Bao of the Song Dynasty as exemplifying ideals of impartiality, fairness, and thoroughness in the adjudication of cases by district
magistrates: 'Judge Bao trying a case-an iron face of impartiality"; 65
"Black-faced Bao [referring to traditional stage make-up depicting
Judge Bao] judging a case-showing no favor towards his relatives or
friends"; 66 'Judge Bao's court-easy to enter, hard to leave" (because
of his thoroughness);67 "Old Judge Bao trying a case-black-faced but
not black-hearted." 6 Contrasting proverbs evidence cultural disapproval of district magistrates with traits or practices thought to be undesirable, such as those unable to exercise good judgment: "An obtuse
magistrate trying a case-each party is sentenced to fifty strokes" (figuratively, punishing each party alike, whether innocent or guilty).69
Equally disapproved were magistrates biased in favor of powerful or
influential parties: "Li Kui [a character from the classic Chinese novel
of the Ming Dynasty Shui Hu Zhuan] trying a case-the stronger party
is held to be in the right";7 0 or magistrates who were excessively heavyhanded in using coercive force: "A blacksmith serving as a magistrate-using nothing but beating and striking."7 1 Other proverbs expressed popular cynicism or resignation about whether formal legal
institutions could provide any protection from exploitation by the
powerful: "Facing a tiger when suing a wolf-there can be no good
outcome," i.e., when powerful people are against you, the courts are
no resort;7 2 or whether the laws would be applied equally against the
powerful and the powerless: "Although the magistrate is allowed to
light fires, ordinary people are not allowed to light lanterns."7 3 Chinese proverbs also reveal a general cultural predilection to avoid overt
disputes whenever possible: "The less salted fish you eat, the less you
get thirsty-don't stir up disputes." 74
Another fecund source of culturally-specific normativity can be
found in the literature of that culture.7 5 Chinese legal scholars are
64

I have taken the examples below from John Rohsenow's recent compilation of Chi-

nese folk sayings. See iU. The English translations given in the text, however, are mine.
65 "Bdo G6ng shn tin-fi midn wz! s-" I& at 8.
66

"Bdo H6 Liffn dudn dnzi-lizi qfn bzir&t" Id.

"Bo L6.o W/de ydmen-hfojzn, ndn chi!" Id.
"Ldo Bdo duan dn--lin hi xfn bHhi" Id. at 119.
69
"Hatngudn dtzan dn-g dd sWiis
dh bdn." Id. at 93.
70 "Li Kuf duhn dn-qidngzhe yfu 1" Ia at 132.
71
"Tiiangzu xiedn gudnr-zhfjingd" Id. at 230.
72 "Xidng ldohd gdo ldngde zhudng-miyou hdo jigu" Id. at 255.
73 "Zhi xd zh6ugdnfinghu6--bzxiL bdi xng didnding. Id. at 295.
74 "Shdo chf xidn y2;shio k6u gdn-(1) bi rshifei ..." Id. at 199.
75 The potential insights that historians can derive from using literary sources is brilliantly demonstrated by Ann Waltner in her work on adoption in late imperial China. She
contrasts the normative values expressed in late-Ming and early-Qing literature with those
in legal codes and cases to expose the interplay between competing normative cultural and
67
68
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singularly fortunate that a wealth of Chinese literature in a variety of
genres survives from the Imperial period, including many works that
focus on the relationship between law, justice, and the moral order in
the social world of Imperial China. Classical Chinese short stories frequently feature lawsuits, criminal trials, and protagonists who choose
to resort to informal methods of dispute resolution.7 6 Within these
short stories, one finds eloquent narratives of conflict and its resolution, rich with a normative vision of the nature ofjustice. In addition
to short stories, there has long been a specific novelistic genre in Chinese literature, somewhat analogous to our detective fiction, in which
the heroes are magistrates called upon to try criminal cases and restore the moral order after the commission of a heinous and baffling
crime.7 7 Similar themes of the relationship between justice and
power, as mediated by the imperial district magistrate, exist in plays
dating from the Yuan Dynasty.7 8 This invaluable literary resource provides a window through which one can view popular visions ofjustice.
By examining vernacular Chinese literature, we find evidence of the
sometimes ambivalent attitude that Chinese popular culture maintamined towards the likelihood that justice could be achieved through
resort to formal state-sanctioned legal institutions and practices.
The popular visions of justice implicit within vernacular Chinese
language and literature can be complemented with the more orthodox ideological view of the law and justice found in the writings of the
quintessential Confucian elite, the district magistrates themselves.
One particularly extensive example can be found in the voluminous
writings of seventeenth century magistrate Huang Liu-hung. 79 In his
manual for magistrates, Huang expounded upon the myriad duties of
a district magistrate in late imperial China, providing advice on functions such as assessing and collecting taxes, regulating the local milijuridical visions of kinship and selfhood as manifested in Chinese adoption practices. ANN
WALTNER, GETTING AN HEIR: ADOPTION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF KINSHIP IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 117-43 (1990).
EcTION (Cyril Birch trans.,
76 See, e.g., FENG MENC-LUNG, STORIES FROM A MING COLLT

1958) (translating excerpts from GuJin Xiao Shuo); Pu SUNG-LING, MORE STRANGE TALES
FROM CHINA (Herbert A. Giles trans., 1988) (translating stories from LIAo CHAI CHIH I); Pu
SUNG-LING, STRANGE STORIES FROM A CHINESE STUDIO (HerbertA. Giles trans., 1880) (trans-

lating excerpts from LIAO CHAI CHIH I).
77 See, e.g., CELEBRATED CASES OFJUDGE DEE (Robert Van Gulik trans., 1976) (not to be
confused with other stories about Judge Dee written by Van Gulik in the style of the authentic Chinese stories); "THE STONE LION" AND OTHER CHINESE DETECTIVE STORIES (Yin-

lien C. Chin et al. trans., 1992).
78 Three of these plays are available in an exceptionally fine translation with commentary by George Hayden. See GEORGE A. HAYDEN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN MEDIEVAL CHINESE DRAMA: THREEJUDGE PAO PLAYS (1978).
79
See HUANG LIu-HUNG, A COMPLETE BOOK CONCERNING HAPPINESS AND BENEVOLENCE

(Djang Chu trans. & ed., 1984) (1699).
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tia, maintaining a healthy fiscal administration,8 0 promoting the
public welfare, 8 ' overseeing the administration ofjustice,8 2 and fulfilling the Confucian ritual obligations of the position.8 3 Because the
administration of the formal legal system played such a prominent
part in the duties of the magistrate, it is unsurprising that a large part
of the manual was dedicated to particular problems faced by the magistrate in his judicial role.8 4 Throughout the manuals, Huang interweaves theories concerning the proper administration of justice with
recommended procedures for magistrates to follow in supervising
criminal investigations,8 5 interrogating witnesses,8 6 and adjudicating
lawsuits.8 7 .Huang also wrote about specific cases that he had adjudicated, providing us with a glimpse of how magistrates constructed
legal "cases" from the raw material of local disputes, what they saw as
their appropriate role in the resolution of these cases, and how they
perceived their adjudication of cases as satisfying the requirements of
justice. Huang's writings also provide part of the source material for
Jonathan Spence's brilliantly realized book, The Death of Woman
Wang8 8 -a richly imagined work exploring the possibilities for justice
in a poor, rural county of northeastern China during the early Qing

Dynasty.
As I hope I have already made clear, the comparative study of
Chinese law would do well to move in the emic direction charted by
the interpretive turn in contemporary anthropology. There is much
more that we need to know about the Chinese legal sensibility before
we can claim some measure of understanding of the imperial Chinese
legal order. We need to explore Chinese normative attitudes towards
personal responsibility and liability, causation and moral agency, and
wrongful intent and harmful consequences. We could benefit in
these projects from historical and ethnographic work exploring the
social construction of the self in Chinese culture,8 9 because only with
80
81

See id. at 181-237.
See id. at 542-54.
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See id. at 251-462.
See id. at 511-12.
See id. at 251-462.
See id. at 253-58, 319-25, 359-375, 380-402, 406-62.
See id. at 265-79, 326-27, 399-402.
See id. at 40-41, 265-73.
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88 JONATHAN D. SPENcE, THE DEATH OF WOMAN WANG (1978). In addition to the usual
documentary sources, Spence also makes use of the short stories of F'u Sung-ling, who
lived in the county in question, to elucidate the ethos of that time and place.
89 A number of historians have considered the impact of the Confucian vision of the
self upon Chinese society. See, e.g., Tu WEI-MING, CoNFUcIAN THOUGHT: SELFHOOD AS CREATIVE TRANSFORMATION (1985); Win. Theodore de Bary, Individualism and Humanitarianism
in Late Ming Thought, in SELF AND SoCiEtY IN MING THOUGHT 145-247 (Wm. Theodore de
Bary ed., 1970); Wim. Theodore de Bary, Introduction to SELF AN SociEry IN MING
THOUGHT 12-24 (Win. Theodore de Bary ed., 1970); Mark Elvin, Between the Earth and
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an understanding of the nature of the self in a society90 can we proceed to fruitful inquiry as to the relationship of that self to the social
order, and the interrelationship between the social order and the natural order. Just as the modem Western legal order is premised upon
the autonomous, individualistic rights-bearing self of the post-Enlightment Western normative order,9 1 so too the Chinese legal order cannot be understood without an appreciation for the Chinese concept
of the self.
The self as imagined in China is not the autonomous, atomistic
individual of the liberal Western imagination, 92 but rather a fundamentally relational and social self:
Rather than creating discrete and unified ontological categories of
persons each having the same equality of rights, it appears that the
Chinese subscribe to a relational construction of persons. That is to
say, the autonomy and rights of persons and the sense of personal
identity are based on differential moral and social statuses and the
moral claims and judgments of others. Chinese personhood and
Heaven: Conceptions of the Self in China, in THE CATEGORY OF THE PERSON: ANTHROPOLOGY,

PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY 156 (Michael Carrithers et al. eds., 1985). Anthropologists, too,
have focussed attention upon various aspects of the construction of the self in Chinese
culture. See, e.g., MARGERY WOLF, A TnUcE-TOLD TAL: FEMINISM, POsTMODERNISM, AND

ETHNOGRAPHIC REsPONsmIrr (1992) 113-16 (highlighting the importance of gender for
the social construction of the self in China); Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, The Gift Economy and
State Power in China, 31 COMP. STUD. IN SOC'Y & HisT. 25, 39-44 (1989) (considering the
relational networks of reciprocity, status, and obligation inherent in the concept of guanxi
as key to the Chinese sense ofself). Cf ExPREssioNs OF SELF IN CHINESE LxrERAT-RE (Rob-

ert E. Hegel & Richard C. Hessney eds., Studies in Oriental Culture, No. 19 1985) (exploring Chinese concepts of the self as exemplified within the Chinese literary tradition);
BERNARD FAURE, CHAN INSIGHTS AND OVERSIGHTS: AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF THE

CHAN TRADITION 243-68 (1993) (reflecting upon the concept of the self in Chan
Buddhism).
90 On the cultural variability of the social construction of the self, see generally Richard A. Shweder & EdnundJ. Bourne, Does the Concept of the Person Vary Cross-Culturally?in
CULTURE THEORY-. ESSAYS ON MIND, SELF, AND EMOTION 158 (Richard A. Shweder & Robert

A. LeVine eds., 1984); Milton Singer, Signs of the Self: An Exploration in Semiotic Anthropology,
82 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 485, 485-507 (1980).
91 It has been suggested that the origin of the autonomous Western self lies not in the
classical tradition, as often assumed, but rather in Anglo-Saxon tribal conceptions of the
primacy of the individual in their cultural world, a world marked by an unusual paucity of
kinship relations. See Robin Fox, The Virgin and the Godfather:.Kinship Versus the State in Greek
Tragedy and After, in ANTHROPOLOGY AND LrrERATRE 107, 108-09 (Paul Benson ed., 1993).
92 The Western construct of the self is, in fact, an unusual construct in comparison
with concepts of the self prevalent in non-Western cultures:
The Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less
integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgment, and action organized into a distinctive whole and
set contrastively both against other such wholes and against its social and
natural background is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world's cultures.

GEERTZ, "From the Nature's Point of Viuw ". On the Nature of Antropological Understanding supra
note 53, at 59.
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personal identity are not given in the abstract as something intrinsic

to and fixed in human nature, but are constantly being created, altered, and dismantled in particular social relationships. Furthermore, the boundaries of personhood are permeable and can easily
be enlarged to encompass a scope beyond that of the biological individual. As a result, Chinese culture presents a frequent lack of
clear-cut boundaries between self and other.93
Without an understanding of this basic normative framework governing the perceived nature of personhood within Chinese culture, it
is impossible to attempt to illuminate concepts within the Chinese
legal normative order, such as the distribution of rights and obliga94
tions of the participants in that normative universe.
Keeping in mind these overarching cultural constructs such as
the nature of the self, the comparativist could then look more specifically at questions inherent in the Chinese legal order-asking, for instance, how the Chinese legal sensibility responded to wrongful
behavior in the light of its assumptions about human nature; examining both formal and informal practices of dispute resolution in the
light of Chinese normative values of community consensus and accommodation; inquiring about the ways in which asymmetrical power
relationships of class, gender, and other social hierarchies affected the
discursive practice and the normative fabric of a legal order predicated upon the affirmative sanctioning of that system of social hierarchy. The challenges and problems inherent in Chinese legal studies
are not unique to that field, but are shared by all scholars seeking to
understand non-Western legal systems. As this consideration of imperial Chinese legal studies shows, an emic approach to comparative
legal studies is both possible and desirable as a methodological perspective. By taking a more emic approach to the interpretive study of
non-Western law, comparative legal scholars will fulfill in our scholarship and teaching the obligation to "regulate the names" that we use
to describe the foreign legal order, ensuring that our language
"appl[ies] correctly to the realities [it] designate[s] .... [A] nd discriminates properly between things that are the same and those that
93 Yang, supra note 89, at 39.
94 For some examples by contemporary anthropologists demonstrating how an understanding of the cultural construction of the self can elucidate the nature of that self within
the legal order, see CAROLJ. GREENHousE, PRAYING FORJUSTICE: FArrH, ORDER AND COMMU.
NrrY IN AN AMERIcAN TowN (1986) (illustrating the role of legal normative values in the
construction of the self in relation to the community among the members of a Southern
Baptist sub-culture); LAWRENCE RosEN, BARGAINING FOR REALrry. THE CoNsTRUCrIoN OF
SocAL RELATIONS IN A MUSUM CommuNrn 165-79 (1984) (explaining the construction of
the self in Moroccan village culture and its effect on the legal order); Akhil Gupta, The

Reincarnationof Souls and the Rebirth of Commodities: Representations of Time in East' and 'West,'
22 CULTURAL CRITQUE 187, 205 (1992) (observing that Western contract law would be
seriously undermined by the concept of the self implicit in reincarnation).
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are different,"95 accomplishing, in our own cultural context and for
our own intellectual purposes, a rectification of names.

95

HSON Tzu, supra note 1, at 142.

